Resumo:
Industrial networks have been migrating toward Ethernet-based architectures, expanding the integration among control systems, field devices, engineering stations, and supervisory systems. In process automation, Ethernet-APL emerges as an enabling technology for extending Ethernet communication down to the field level, allowing the use of industrial protocols, such as PROFINET, in applications that require longer distances, two-wire communication, and compatibility with process environments. However, this increased connectivity also expands the exposure surface of industrial assets, making it necessary to apply cybersecurity concepts from the early stages of the network architecture design.
This dissertation presents the study and application of cybersecurity concepts in a PROFINET network involving the Ethernet-APL physical layer. For this purpose, an experimental test bench was developed, composed of a conventional PROFINET island, a PROFINET over Ethernet-APL island, a controller, an engineering station, industrial switches, firewalls, field devices, and an unauthorized test device. The architecture was organized according to the concepts of zones and conduits, enabling the evaluation of communication, commissioning, bandwidth consumption, availability, asset exposure, and response to anomalous traffic.
The results showed that PROFINET communication over Ethernet-APL could be functionally established, but required specific care regarding topology and timing parameters when industrial firewalls were inserted into the architecture. It was observed that firewalls, even when operating in Bridge mode, should not be treated as fully transparent elements for PROFINET topology configuration. It was also verified that conventional PROFINET devices required adjustments to update times and watchdog times to maintain communication stability within the implemented infrastructure. In the cybersecurity tests, firewall filtering reduced asset exposure and prevented unauthorized traffic from directly reaching protected devices.
In the Ethernet-APL island, the evaluated field device showed greater sensitivity when directly subjected to anomalous traffic, reinforcing the importance of protecting the border of the APL segment. It is concluded that the use of Ethernet-APL in PROFINET networks is technically feasible; however, its secure application depends on proper network segmentation, firewall configuration, controlled asset exposure, and adequate adjustment of communication timing parameters.